An Introduction to Evolutionary Ethics by James Scott M

Author:James, Scott M.
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Published: 2010-10-06T16:00:00+00:00

5.6 Non-Nativist Doubts

But even this conservative view of morality is too much for the philosopher Jesse Prinz. Prinz is not convinced that non-nativist accounts of morality cannot account for the data just mentioned. A less negative way of putting the same point: Prinz thinks the data are perfectly compatible with a non-nativist story. Let's begin with the case of so-called moral universals.

According to Prinz (2008b: 372), the moral nativist has to show at least three things to prove her case. First, she must show that there really are similar moral rules that appear in all cultures. This would be equivalent to showing that there is a Universal Moral Grammar, akin to the Universal Grammar posited by Chomsky. Second, the nativist must show that there are no plausible non-nativist ways of explaining those universal moral rules. If a non-nativist story can adequately explain the data, then unless there is some other reason that we must accept nativism, we should go with the simpler story: children learn the rules of morality in the same way that they learn so many other aspects of life. Finally, the nativist must show that the innate machinery responsible for making moral judgments is specific to morality; that is, she must show that this machinery is not the result of (merely) innate general-purpose cognitive mechanisms. After all, non-nativists like Prinz are not opposed to the idea that certain general-purpose learning mechanisms are innate. It's hard to see kids learn anything without some inborn capacity to form theories about their experiences. Despite the efforts of nativists like Hauser and Sripada, Prinz doubts that the nativist can show any of these things – much less all of them.

As far as the existence of universal moral rules goes, Prinz thinks the evidence is “depressingly weak” (2008b: 373). A little tour through the world's cultures quickly reveals that, for example, the toleration of harm is “as common as its prohibition.” Take the Yanamomo of the Amazon region, or the Ilongot of Luzon, or the highland tribes of New Guinea, or the Aztecs, or even sub-cultures within large-scale industrial societies: all reveal quite permissive attitudes toward violence. Some people are not only not averse to killing others; they celebrate it. Of course we like to think that pretty much everyone judges that harming others is wrong. But an honest appraisal of the world's people, says Prinz, casts serious doubt on the idea that there is a universal moral prohibition on harming others.

It may be responded that all cultures prohibit harm for no good reason. But the non-nativist can readily account for this universality. What good, asks Prinz, is harming someone if it serves no personal end? Indeed, it's often the case that harming others brings with it steep social costs. Children learn early on that misbehaving has its consequences. So to explain the (alleged) fact that all cultures prohibit harm for no good reason does not require positing an innate moral system. All it requires is the capacity to learn which things elicit negative reactions in others and perhaps the disposition to avoid those things.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.